security: review fixes (dialed-number filter, browser endpoint ACL, IVR direct dial, …)

The 08 §1 threat table checked line by line against the code, plus a review by a separate agent
that hadn't written it. Findings were reproduced with a failing test before each fix:

- Critical: "011…,4" turned the route's Goto into Goto(sp-route-…,011…,4,1), starting past the
  class check, so any extension could call abroad. FILTER on the dialed number (also stops "&"
  adding a Dial target). trunk-test.ts proves it.
- High: -web endpoints (desk phone's password, any transport) skipped the phone ACL; now
  127.0.0.1 only when it's on. call-test.ts: UDP refused, WebSocket from 127.0.0.1 registers.
- IVR direct dial no longer reaches paging groups or parked calls (sp-ivr-direct).
- Trunks identify_by = ip: a From of trunk-<id> from anywhere no longer rings phones.
- .dockerignore is an allowlist, so the public source archive can't pick up stray files.
- CSRF check on the matched route (/%61pi/… got around it); Linphone tokens masked in logs;
  /api/live checks Origin and re-checks the session; *45/** filter digits; pg_dump password in
  the environment; more webhook ranges blocked.

The review and what's left for the owner are in 08 §6.

Task: M11-T8

apps/api/test/integrations.test.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ it('isPrivateAddress', () => {
     'fe80::1',
     'fd00::1',
     '::ffff:7f00:1',
+    '198.18.0.1',
+    '192.0.0.8',
+    '64:ff9b::a00:1',
+    '2002:7f00:1::1',
   ])
     expect(isPrivateAddress(ip), ip).toBe(true);
   for (const ip of ['8.8.8.8', '203.0.113.9', '2001:4860:4860::8888', '::ffff:8.8.8.8'])