auth: two-step sign-in (TOTP) for admins, with recovery codes

auth/totp.ts per 08 §2.4: RFC 6238 (HMAC-SHA1, 30 s, 6 digits, ±1
step) with node:crypto only, checked against the RFC's test vectors.
Migration 0003: users.totp_recovery_hashes and totp_last_step.

Admins turn it on from My account (the header's "Account"): scan the
QR or type the key, confirm a code, get 10 recovery codes once. Login
asks for the code only after the password is right (401 totp_required,
no session); a wrong code is a failed login (rate limit, audit). A
step signs in once (totp_last_step updated atomically) and a recovery
code once (array_remove guarded by any()). Off and new codes need the
password; another admin can turn it off for a lost phone, which signs
that user out. Users list shows it (twoStep).

Also, found by the full e2e chain on one shared database:
- Linphone tokens: only the exact token issued is accepted. The last
  base64 character can carry ignored bits, so another spelling decoded
  to the same signed token.
- Test scripts no longer assume a fresh system: m3-t3 picks Dan in the
  test box, m8-check dials whatever slot the park took (findslot =
  next), m10-t4 uses the admin's existing extension, m11-t1 clears the
  public IP on its own first (local nets are in the transports while
  one is set, and transports change only on a restart).

e2e m11-t1-totp; the full chain M1-M11 (33 scripts) passes.

Task: M11-T1

apps/api/test/schema.test.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ const EXPECTED: Record<string, Record<string, string>> = {
     role: "USER-DEFINED:user_role|NO|'user'::user_role",
     is_active: 'boolean|NO|true',
     totp_secret_enc: 'text|YES|',
+    totp_recovery_hashes: "ARRAY:_text|NO|'{}'::text[]",
+    totp_last_step: 'bigint|YES|',
     must_change_password: 'boolean|NO|false',
     last_login_at: 'timestamp with time zone|YES|',
     ...ts,