MB1 (spec 13). Decision 0005: our own Android/iPhone app, Expo in the
mobile repo, user portal only, no push in v1.
- mobile_devices (migration 0013): one-time pairing codes from My settings
(QR or server + code, 10 minutes), traded by the app for an spm_ device
token that acts as its user and never as an admin
- POST /api/me/mobile-devices/pair (web session only), POST /api/mobile/pair,
GET/DELETE /api/me/mobile-devices
- signing out everywhere (password change or reset, disabling) removes
paired phones too
- My settings: Mobile app section with the QR code and paired phones
- mobile/ (its own repo) ignored here
Spec 12 S2: openid-client 6.8 (decision 0004). Discovery, PKCE + state + nonce, ID token
signatures checked, userinfo always read. Users connect their OpenID account from My account
and sign in either way; no accounts are made; a user without a password is matched once by
verified email. auth.mode mixed and oidc (admins keep a password way in), role from adminGroups,
allowedGroups, signing out at the provider. Settings -> Sign-in with Test. Tested against a fake
provider with RS256 and ES256 keys.
Spec 12 S1: migration 0012 (password_hash nullable, user_identities, sessions.method and the
OpenID token columns), auth.mode (only "password" until S2), GET /api/auth/methods, login body
{login, password} (email still accepted), signIn on users and /api/auth/me, a Signs in with
column on Users. The last active admin with a password can't be deleted, disabled or demoted.
The 08 §1 threat table checked line by line against the code, plus a review by a separate agent
that hadn't written it. Findings were reproduced with a failing test before each fix:
- Critical: "011…,4" turned the route's Goto into Goto(sp-route-…,011…,4,1), starting past the
class check, so any extension could call abroad. FILTER on the dialed number (also stops "&"
adding a Dial target). trunk-test.ts proves it.
- High: -web endpoints (desk phone's password, any transport) skipped the phone ACL; now
127.0.0.1 only when it's on. call-test.ts: UDP refused, WebSocket from 127.0.0.1 registers.
- IVR direct dial no longer reaches paging groups or parked calls (sp-ivr-direct).
- Trunks identify_by = ip: a From of trunk-<id> from anywhere no longer rings phones.
- .dockerignore is an allowlist, so the public source archive can't pick up stray files.
- CSRF check on the matched route (/%61pi/… got around it); Linphone tokens masked in logs;
/api/live checks Origin and re-checks the session; *45/** filter digits; pg_dump password in
the environment; more webhook ranges blocked.
The review and what's left for the owner are in 08 §6.
Task: M11-T8
argon2id passwords with a min length and a common-password list (SecLists,
MIT). Login failures are limited per IP and per email; must_change_password
blocks everything outside /api/auth/*. The first admin is created from env
on startup. pnpm dev derives DATABASE_URL from .env.
Task: M1-T3
iamdoubz