The 08 §1 threat table checked line by line against the code, plus a review by a separate agent
that hadn't written it. Findings were reproduced with a failing test before each fix:
- Critical: "011…,4" turned the route's Goto into Goto(sp-route-…,011…,4,1), starting past the
class check, so any extension could call abroad. FILTER on the dialed number (also stops "&"
adding a Dial target). trunk-test.ts proves it.
- High: -web endpoints (desk phone's password, any transport) skipped the phone ACL; now
127.0.0.1 only when it's on. call-test.ts: UDP refused, WebSocket from 127.0.0.1 registers.
- IVR direct dial no longer reaches paging groups or parked calls (sp-ivr-direct).
- Trunks identify_by = ip: a From of trunk-<id> from anywhere no longer rings phones.
- .dockerignore is an allowlist, so the public source archive can't pick up stray files.
- CSRF check on the matched route (/%61pi/… got around it); Linphone tokens masked in logs;
/api/live checks Origin and re-checks the session; *45/** filter digits; pg_dump password in
the environment; more webhook ranges blocked.
The review and what's left for the owner are in 08 §6.
Task: M11-T8
iamdoubz
5c46bd0e85